According to Order №65 of the Prosecutor General’s Office dated March 3, 2026, “On Conducting a Corruption Risk Assessment in the Activities of the Prosecutor General’s Office”, the draft Anti-Corruption Program of the Prosecutor General’s Office for 2026–2028 (hereinafter – the Anti-Corruption Program) was developed.
The Anti-Corruption Program defines a system of measures aimed at preventing corruption and corruption-related offenses in the activities of prosecutorial authorities, improving mechanisms for managing corruption risks, strengthening the institutional capacity of prosecutorial bodies in the area of corruption prevention, and fostering a culture of integrity within the prosecutorial community.
When drafting the Anti-Corruption Program, the Prosecutor General’s Office (hereinafter – PGO) did not sufficiently identify all corruption risks arising from the exercise of powers and functions by prosecutorial authorities.
According to the provisions of Part 1 of Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prevention of Corruption”, the PGO is responsible for approving the anti-corruption program. The provisions of Part 2 of Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prevention of Corruption” set forth requirements for the content of anti-corruption programs. In particular, such programs must define the principles of the agency’s overall policy on preventing and combating corruption in the relevant sphere, measures for their implementation, as well as measures for implementing the Anti-corruption Strategy and the National Anti-corruption Program. In addition, anti-corruption programs must include an assessment of corruption risks in the activities of the relevant institutions, identifying the causes of such risks and the conditions that contribute to them. It is also mandatory to include measures to eliminate the identified corruption risks, specifying the responsible persons, deadlines for implementation, and the necessary resources.
- Regarding the resumption of competitive procedures for selection, appointment and transfer to leadership (administrative) positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices
The Working Group on Corruption Risk Assessment at the Prosecutor General’s Office has identified a number of functions and processes exposed to corruption risks, including procedural guidance and conduct of public prosecutions, oversight of pre-trial investigative activities, representation of the state’s interests in court, personnel management, assessment of prosecutors’ performance and other areas of activity. At the same time, the functions and processes identified as exposed to corruption risks in the Draft Anti-Corruption Program of the Prosecutor General’s Office for 2026–2028 do not cover certain significant procedural shortcomings in personnel management.
In July 2025, the Law of Ukraine № 4555-IX amended the legislation governing the appointment of prosecutors particularly to leadership positions without a competitive selection process. Specifically, the Transitional Provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” were supplemented by paragraph 5-4, which provides as follows:
“5-4. During the period of martial law:
1) A prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office or a regional prosecutor’s office may be appointed by transfer, without conducting the competitive selection procedure provided for in Article 38 of this Law, from among prosecutors of lower-level prosecutor’s offices, as well as a person who did not hold the position of prosecutor on the date of entry into force of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding the specifics of pre-trial investigation of criminal offenses related to persons missing under special circumstances during the period of martial law”.
Such a person shall meet the requirements for candidates for the position of a prosecutor in a prosecutor’s office of the respective level, as provided for in Article 27 of this Law;
2) appointment to the position of a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office or a regional prosecutor’s office shall be carried out on the basis of a submitted application;
3) persons who do not hold the position of a prosecutor shall submit the documents specified in Article 30 of this Law;
4) appointment to the position of a prosecutor of persons who do not hold the position of a prosecutor shall be carried out following a special verification procedure in accordance with the procedure established by the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”.
Thus, for the period of martial law, legislation has introduced a mechanism for appointing prosecutors, including to leadership positions, without a competitive selection procedure, based only on the submission of an application.
This means that individuals may serve in the prosecution system who were appointed through personal connections, without any testing or integrity vetting. Such an approach entrenches practices of favoritism, whereby key positions are held not by the most competent candidates, but by individuals close to senior management.
Risk: undermining the guarantees of prosecutorial independence as a procedurally independent participant in criminal proceedings, and creating dependence on leadership whose decisions effectively determine the prosecutor’s appointment or future career advancement, may affect the prosecutor’s objectivity and impartiality in the exercise of procedural supervision functions.
The establishment of an independent prosecutorial corps based on competition, equal access to positions, and objective and impartial assessment of candidates is one of the key elements of anti-corruption policy.
Reforming the prosecution system remains a priority in 2026 in the context of Ukraine`s European integration. Indeed, in December 2025, a joint statement by European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka emphasized, among other things, the need to introduce a transparent, merit-based, and competitive selection procedure for prosecutors, including an assessment of professional competence and integrity.
Improving the selection process for prosecutors appointed to administrative positions and introducing procedures to evaluate the quality of their work remain key issues for international partners. These priorities are also mentioned in national strategic documents, such as the Roadmap on the Rule of Law; the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Reform of Law Enforcement Agencies as Part of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Sector for 2023–2027 (hereinafter referred to as the CSP). Furthermore, this is part of GRECO’s recommendations (Recommendation №. XXV).
Specifically, Action 4.6.4 of the CSP provides for the drafting and submission to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of draft law aimed at establishing a transparent and inclusive procedure for the selection and appointment of personnel to law enforcement bodies, including relevant managerial positions within law enforcement bodies and the Prosecutor’s Office. Such a procedure should be based on professional competence and integrity, taking into account best national and international practices for conducting competitive procedures. The CSP also involves independent observers in the activities of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and quality assessment commissions; In addition, it calls for the study and systematization of the practices of such bodies; and providing recommendations to improve the effectiveness of their work.
At the same time, paragraph 1.2 (3) of the Rule of Law Roadmap requires the adoption of legislation that will ensure a more transparent and merit-based selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office (Head and Deputy head of a division), regional and district prosecutor’s offices (head and deputy head of a prosecution office, or a unit within it), which includes: clear criteria for evaluating candidates for the position, including professional competence and integrity; a transparent, competitive, and merit-based selection procedure, including verification of professional competence and integrity, etc.
Moreover, this does not comply with the principle of merit-based recruitment for public positions in accordance with OECD standards, nor with the requirements set out by the EU in its latest Enlargement Reports for 2024 and 2025.
In particular, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity of 26 January 2017 emphasizes the need to promote a professional public service based on merit, committed to the values of public service and good governance, including through: 1) ensuring human resource management that consistently applies fundamental principles such as integrity, merit-based recruitment, and transparency, in order to support professionalism in the public service, prevent favoritism and nepotism, protect against undue political interference, and minimize the risks of abuse of office and misconduct; 2) ensuring a fair and open system of recruitment, selection, and promotion based on objective criteria and formalized procedures, as well as a performance evaluation system that promotes accountability and strengthens public service ethics.
However, the Anti-Corruption Program of Prosecutor General’s Office for 2026–2028 lacks measures aimed at initiating and facilitating the resumption of competitive selection procedures for candidates for appointment and transfer to leadership and other prosecutorial positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office, as well as in regional and district prosecutor’s offices.
On the basis of the above, we submit proposals to the risk register by supplementing it with an additional corruption risk (see Annex 1).
- On the de facto restoration of the Prosecutor’s Office’s investigative powers
In Section 4, Subsection 4 “Identification of Corruption Risks, their analysis and risk level assessment” of Section II, the Anti-Corruption Programme identifies procedural guidance and the maintenance of public prosecution; administration of and access to the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations and other information systems; oversight of operational-search activities; representation of the state’s interests in court; and other related functions as those particularly vulnerable to corruption.
At the same time, functions and processes exposed to corruption were identified in the Draft Anti-Corruption Programme for 2026–2028 primarily cover specific areas of prosecutorial activity, in particular procedural supervision of pre-trial investigations and the maintenance of public prosecution. However, the prosecutor’s procedural powers in criminal proceedings are broader in scope. Specifically, pursuant to Article 36(2)(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, a prosecutor is empowered not only to instruct an investigator or pre-trial investigation body to carry out investigative (search) and other procedural actions or to issue instructions regarding their conduct, but also to participate in such actions and, where necessary, to conduct investigative (search) and procedural actions personally. This is consistent with other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine governing the conduct of procedural actions, including those relating to temporary access to items and documents (Chapter 15), temporary seizure of property (Chapter 16), investigative (search) actions (Article 223), and questioning (Article 224).
Accordingly, the prosecutor’s powers under the criminal procedure legislation to directly conduct certain investigative (search) and procedural actions constitute a distinct aspect of the prosecutor’s procedural function and involve discretionary decision-making, giving rise to potential corruption risks. However, these powers were not identified by the Working Group on Corruption Risk Assessment of the Prosecutor General’s Office as separate corruption-prone functions or processes in the Draft Anti-Corruption Programme.
Risk: the potential for abuse of procedural powers during the independent conduct by prosecutors of investigative (search) and other procedural actions in the course of pre-trial investigations particularly in the absence of adequate mechanisms for the functional delineation of powers and internal control.
MEZHA considers that the independent conduct by prosecutors of investigative (search) and other procedural actions during pre-trial investigations should be identified as a separate, fourteenth corruption-prone function or process in the list of identified corruption risks.
During the review of information from the Unified State Register of Court Decisions, we identified that prosecutors from the Division for Ensuring the Exercise of the Prosecutor General’s Powers in Criminal Proceedings within the Department of Organizational and Control Activities of the Prosecutor General’s Office (directly subordinate to the Prosecutor General) independently carrying out criminal procedural measures. In particular, this is evidenced by rulings of investigating judges of the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv in cases №757/10173/26-к, №757/10174/26-к, №757/10175/26-к, №757/14089/26-к, and other similar cases.
The analysis of the relevant court decisions reveals a number of common features. First, the details of the criminal proceedings, in particular their registration numbers in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations, indicate that the relevant information was entered into the Register by prosecutors of the Prosecutor General’s Office themselves. Second, the motions addressed to investigating judges requesting temporary access to items and documents were submitted by prosecutors of the Division for Ensuring the Exercise of the Prosecutor General’s Powers in Criminal Proceedings within the Prosecutor General’s Office. Third, the authority to execute the respective court orders granting temporary access to items and documents was granted directly to these same prosecutors, without the involvement of investigators or other participants in the criminal proceedings.
Such an approach not only creates additional corruption risks associated with the concentration of a significant volume of procedural powers in the hands of a single official, but is also not fully consistent with the overall logic of prosecutorial reform that has been consistently implemented in Ukraine since its accession to the Council of Europe. Upon joining the Council of Europe in 1995, Ukraine undertook to transform the role and functions of the prosecution service, primarily by abandoning elements of the Soviet model of a “general supervisory prosecutor’s office” and bringing the activities of this institution into compliance with Council of Europe standards, as reflected in Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Opinion № 190 (1995). In particular, Ukraine committed itself to changing the role and functions of the prosecution service, especially with regard to the general supervision over compliance with the law, by transforming this institution into a body consistent with Council of Europe standards.
Subsequently, the Venice Commission, in a number of opinions on the reform of the prosecution service in Ukraine, including CDL-AD(2012)019 and CDL-AD(2013)025, emphasized that the Ukrainian prosecution service had for a long time retained an excessively broad scope of powers inherited from the Soviet model of a “general supervisory prosecution service.” The Commission repeatedly underlined the need to limit the functions of the prosecution service to the sphere of criminal justice, to discontinue non-prosecutorial supervisory and investigative functions, to eliminate excessive centralization of the prosecution system, and to reduce the excessive concentration of powers in the hands of the Prosecutor General. The abandonment of the functions of general supervision over the observance and application of laws, as well as of pre-trial investigation, which had long been retained as transitional provisions in the Constitution of Ukraine, was assessed particularly positively.
A consistent position of European institutions is also that excessive concentration of procedural powers within a single authority or official is impermissible. In its opinions, the Venice Commission has repeatedly emphasized that the combination within the prosecution service of functions related to the detection of offenses, the conduct of investigations, procedural supervision, and the maintenance of public prosecution is a characteristic feature of the Soviet model of the prosecution service and is not compatible with the principles of the rule of law, good governance, and the system of checks and balances. Similar issues have repeatedly been the subject of criticism in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Ukraine.
The constitutional content of paragraph 2 of part 1 of Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine indicates that the prosecution service is vested with the functions of “organizing and providing procedural guidance of pre-trial investigations,” as well as “supervising covert and other investigative and search activities of law enforcement agencies”. The use by the legislator of the terms “organization,” “procedural guidance,” and “supervision” indicates the coordinating, supervisory, and procedurally directing nature of the prosecution service’s powers in relation to pre-trial investigations.
The Constitution of Ukraine, however, does not assign to the prosecution service the function of directly conducting pre-trial investigations or performing the functions of a pre-trial investigation authority. The absence in Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine of such formulations as “conducting pre-trial investigations,” “carrying out investigative (search) actions,” or “collecting evidence” cannot be regarded as accidental, as the 2016 constitutional reform was specifically aimed at removing the investigative function from the competence of the prosecution service.
A similar approach is reflected in the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office.” In particular, pursuant to paragraph 3 of part 1 of Article 2 of this Law, one of the functions of the prosecution service is defined as “supervision over compliance with the law by bodies conducting operational and investigative activities, inquiry, and pre-trial investigation.” The use by the legislator of the formulation “supervision over … bodies” presupposes the existence of a separate subject whose activities are object to prosecutorial supervision. Such wording does not confer upon the prosecution service general competence to conduct operational and investigative activities, inquiry, or pre-trial investigation; on the contrary, it confirms the functional separation between the prosecutor as a supervisory authority and the pre-trial investigation body as the body responsible for conducting such activities
Accordingly, the attribution to the prosecution service of powers related to organization, procedural guidance, and supervision does not imply conferral of general competence to directly conduct pre-trial investigations. Such powers are, by their nature, derivative of the activities of pre-trial investigation bodies and are intended to ensure the legality and effectiveness of their work, rather than to substitute for it.
An alternative interpretation would in fact lead to the identification of the supervisory authority with the entity subject to supervision, which would be contrary to the principle of functional separation of powers between the prosecutor and the investigator, deriving from Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office,” and the objectives of the constitutional reform of the prosecution service.
It is noteworthy that the need for prosecutors to focus on the exercise of functions inherent to the prosecution service was publicly emphasized by the Deputy Head of the Department for Organizational and Control Activities, Legal and Analytical Support – Head of the Division for Ensuring the Exercise of the Prosecutor General’s Powers in Criminal Proceedings, Aidyn Khudiyev. In particular, during a podcast of the Prosecutor General’s Office, he noted that a prosecutor should perform public prosecution and procedural supervision over pre-trial investigations, i.e., exercise the functions inherent to the prosecution service without exceeding the scope of his powers. At the same time, an analysis of case-law indicates that prosecutors within the division headed by him have carried out certain procedural actions related to evidence gathering, which in practice combines within a single official both the functions of procedural supervision and the direct performance of certain investigative measures.
However, the Prosecutor General’s Office Anti-Corruption Program for 2026–2028 does not include measures to reduce discretionary powers in relation to prosecutors’ independent exercise of investigative functions.
On the basis of the above, we submit proposals to the risk register by supplementing it with an additional corruption risk (see Annex 1).