Context
On 7 August 2025, Members of Parliament of Ukraine from the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement registered Draft Law No. 13603 “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ Regarding the Improvement of the Efficiency of Prosecutorial Authorities”.
On 18 June 2026, the draft law was included in the agenda of an extraordinary meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement Activities for consideration.
Draft Law No. 13603 proposes the introduction of a system of state ranks within the prosecution service without clearly defined criteria for their assignment, promotion, or demotion. Under such conditions, these ranks may become not a tool for assessing professional achievements, but rather an additional mechanism for influencing prosecutors’ career advancement and a means of exerting pressure within the prosecution system.
Risks of the Draft Law
| 1. Granting the Prosecutor General Unjustified Discretionary Powers. |
The draft law proposes to supplement the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” with a new Article 20¹ and introduce a system of state ranks for prosecutors. State ranks would be assigned simultaneously with appointment to the position of prosecutor, while subsequent ranks would be awarded taking into account the prosecutor’s position, length of service, as well as their professional and personal qualities.
The ranks of State Counsellor of Justice of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Rank would be conferred by the President of Ukraine upon the submission of the Prosecutor General, whereas all other ranks would be assigned directly by the Prosecutor General. At the same time, the procedure for assigning, demoting and depriving prosecutors of state ranks would be regulated by the Regulation on State Ranks of Prosecutors, which would also be approved by the Prosecutor General.
The draft law does not define the meaning of such criteria as “professional and personal qualities of a prosecutor”, does not establish a procedure for their assessment, and does not provide mechanisms for reviewing the reasonableness of the relevant decisions. Moreover, the law effectively delegates to the Prosecutor General the authority to independently determine a substantial part of the rules governing the operation of the state rank system through a subordinate regulatory act.
Under such conditions, the system of state ranks may become an additional mechanism for influencing career advancement, since decisions on the assignment, promotion or demotion of ranks would largely depend on an assessment whose criteria and procedure are not defined by law.
This approach raises concerns regarding its compatibility with the fundamental principles governing the prosecution service. Pursuant to Article 3(1)(5) of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, the activities of the prosecution service are based on the principle of prosecutorial independence, which includes guarantees against unlawful political, material or other influence on prosecutors in the exercise of their functions. Furthermore, Article 15(2) of the Law provides that prosecutors in Ukraine have a unified status regardless of their place within the prosecutorial system or the administrative position they hold.
A similar principle is enshrined in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. Under Article 36(1) of the CPC, a prosecutor is independent in carrying out procedural activities, and interference by persons lacking legal authority is prohibited.
The introduction of a system of state ranks, the assignment, promotion and demotion of which would depend on an assessment of a prosecutor’s “professional and personal qualities”, the content and assessment methodology of which are not established by law, effectively creates an additional mechanism for influencing a prosecutor’s career status. Given that decisions on most state ranks would be taken by the Prosecutor General, while the relevant procedures would be determined by a regulation approved by the Prosecutor General himself, the proposed model creates risks of increasing prosecutors’ internal dependence on the leadership of the prosecution service.
Furthermore, the proposed approach is inconsistent with international standards. Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe provides that states should take measures to ensure that prosecutors’ careers, promotions and transfers are carried out according to known and objective criteria.
In addition, the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, in Opinion No. 13 (2018), emphasized that prosecutors must enjoy not only external but also internal independence, meaning that they must be able to perform their duties and responsibilities without undue internal pressure from within the prosecution service.
At the same time, Draft Law No. 13603 proposes that the assignment, promotion, demotion and deprivation of state ranks be based on criteria that are not defined by law, while the procedure for their application would be established by an act of the Prosecutor General. As a result, the proposed model lacks sufficient guarantees of objectivity in prosecutors’ career advancement and creates additional risks of internal influence by the leadership of the prosecution service over prosecutors’ professional status.
| 2. Granting the President of Ukraine Unjustified Discretionary Powers. |
The draft law proposes granting the President of Ukraine the authority to confer the highest state ranks on prosecutors. Pursuant to the proposed amendments to Articles 9 and 20¹ of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, the Prosecutor General would submit nominations to the President for the conferment of the ranks of State Counsellor of Justice of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Rank.
At the same time, the decision of the President of Ukraine would be decisive for the conferment of such ranks. The draft law does not establish any criteria for adopting such decisions, does not set any deadlines for their adoption, and does not provide any legal consequences in the event of refusal or inaction by the President following receipt of a submission from the Prosecutor General. As a result, the conferment of the highest prosecutorial ranks would depend entirely on the discretionary decision of the Head of State.
This approach is also inconsistent with Ukraine’s European integration commitments. In its Common Position on the opening of Cluster 1 “Fundamentals of the Accession Process”, the European Union emphasized the need to further strengthen the independence, integrity and institutional capacity of prosecutorial governance bodies, as well as to ensure high standards of integrity, transparency and merit-based procedures in selection and appointment processes. The European Union also specifically stressed the need to further depoliticise the position of the Prosecutor General through the introduction of more objective, transparent and merit-based procedures.
Conclusion. The draft law contains a number of corruption risks and is not recommended for adoption.