Зміст публікації
17 February, 2026
1. Ukraine’s reform progress should be given a boost
In 2025, the European Commission published its latest report on Ukraine’s progress towards the EU. Regarding progress on Chapter 24, the European Commission notes that institutional cooperation and coordination remain weak, as do integrity and accountability. The political pressure exerted on NABU and SAPO through the Security Service of Ukraine underscores the absence of reliable safeguards.
Reform Backsliding is a Government Choice, Not the People’s Will
The slowdown in the pace of reforms and the lack of decisions regarding key law enforcement bodies in Ukraine are the direct responsibility of the Government. However, it is important to understand that the sabotage of our commitments does not reflect the true position of the Ukrainian people.
- 85% of Ukrainians support EU accession; 54.7% favor continuing reforms even despite Viktor Orbán’s veto on opening clusters; 62.8% support EU and U.S. pressure to overcome corruption.
- The Ukrainian people have confirmed their position not only through responses in opinion polls, but also through concrete resistance to the abolishment of NABU and SAPO in July 2025.
To further support the Ukrainian people’s aspiration for European integration, increased support from EU Member States is required.
2. The role of international partners is extremely important
The EU Commission has decidedto propose a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026-2027, fast-tracked by the European Parliament: “In all cases, funding will be linked to strict conditions on Ukraine’s side such as adherence to the rule of law, including the fight against corruption.”
International partners have consistently played a key role in shaping and overseeing major reform processes. It’s due to the fact, the majority of requirements in the sphere of combating corruption were commitments to international partners in order to receive funding (for example, IMF, Ukraine Facility, etc.), or political/economic benefits (for example, Visa-free regime). For example, NABU – a structural benchmark of the IMF (Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies dated August 18, 2014); NACP – a prerequisite for granting the visa-free regime (Visa Liberalization Action Plan – VLAP), etc.
We therefore call on the European Commission to ensure that budget support for Ukraine in 2026–2027 is linked to concrete and measurable benchmarks from the ten-point priority plan, including: safeguarding the independence and operational capacity of anti-corruption institutions (NABU, SAPO, High Anti-Corruption Court); reform of the Prosecutor’s General appointment and dismissal procedures, as well as an overhaul of the SBI to prevent political influence.
3. Attempts to undermine the anti-corruption system are still ongoing
- Oleksiy Shevchuk is still a member of the SAPO competitive commission. On 23 December 2025, Prosecutor General Kravchenko delegated Oleksii Shevchuk (he is the subject of journalistic investigations, has faced disciplinary action as an attorney, has supported unconstitutional laws of a dictator, Viktor Yanukovych, and has worked for pro-Russian individuals). Over 60 civil society organizations called to revoke the delegation, but as of early February, it had not been reversed. However, the Prosecutor General is manipulating the false information by claiming that he cannot exclude Oleksii Shevchuk from the Competitive Commission.
- NABU still does not have the technical capacity to conduct independent surveillance and does not have access to its own independent forensic institution. During a year, NABU and SAPO order between 600 and 800 expert examinations to prove evidence in criminal proceedings. Most high-profile investigations require expert examinations to establish the guilt of the individuals involved (for example, the cases of Tymoshenko, Mindych, Shurma, etc.). To prevent unlawful influence from management or third parties, they have been advocating for the creation of an independent expert institution dedicated to their needs. At the same time, instead of real action, we see only manipulation on the part of the Ministry of Justice. In 2024, the Ministry of Justice established the Research Center for Independent Forensic Examinations as part of Ukraine’s commitments to the IMF to ensure NABU’s access to independent expertise. However, this institution has no anti-corruption safeguards, so it is not independent. And its director, Andriy Svintsytskyi is a figure of a journalistic investigation (ties with betrayer Andriy Naumov; over the past few years, the family has acquired real estate and vehicles worth approximately one million dollars, despite the absence of commensurate income).
NABU requires a truly independent institution under the Cabinet of Ministers, with competitive selection of management, a supervisory board, and integrity checks. They want to exclude any ministry’s influence from it.
- The Parliamentary temporary investigative commission of Sergey Vlasenko still works. It poses risks, as its mandate was used last year to put pressure on civil society, the judiciary and the anti-corruption system. This year, the commission plans to continue to review the work of NABU, HACC, and SAPO between April and June.
4. Unreformed law enforcement agencies are pressuring the anti-corruption infrastructure and civil society, that’s why law enforcement reforms are a priority despite the lack of a political will
2025 showed how dangerous unreformed law enforcement agencies may be:
- The Security Service of Ukraine (the SSU) interfered in the competitive selection of the Director of the ESBU.
- In July, 2025 the SBI filed a notice of suspicion to the activist, Vitaliy Shabunin.
- Groundless searches of NABU detectives, as well as cases opened against them. The first political prisoners: NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov has been unlawfully held in a pre-trial detention center by the SSU for over 5 months. The SSU in agreement with Herman Galushenko, former Minister of Justice, provided to Ruslan a camera with awful conditions like for a dangerous criminal.
- There is a systemic attempt to restrict reformed law enforcement authorities through legislation: for example the draft law No12414 (regarding dismantling of NABU and SAPO); the draft law No12439 (regarding the initiation of proceedings subject to the ESBU based on decisions of prosecution leadership).
On 11 December 2025, the Joint Statement between Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka identified as key priorities: strengthening the independence of NABU and SAPO, conduct a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedure of the Prosecutor General, Reform the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI).
Progress made is low: (1) On 3 January 2026, the President promised to develop a draft law on SBI reform and urgently submit it to Parliament by the end of January. However, no presidential draft law has been registered. Radina and Zhelezniak registered a draft law to reform the SBI, following the example used for the ESBU and the Customs Service (draft law No.13602 as of 06 August 2025). However, it is currently not progressing in Parliament, and it is evident that it will not receive the necessary number of votes unless there is political will from the Presidential Office to secure such votes. (2) As for reforming the Prosecutor General’s Office, there is not even a discussion at this stage. Moreover, when civil society and media started talking about the resignation of Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko, he threatened to “come after” each of his critics. Moreover, we detected Russian ties in Kravchenko’s family. Ruslan Kravchenko’s father, Andrii Kravchenko, obtained a Russian passport in June 2023. At the same time, Maria Vdovychenko, Viktor Lohachov, and Maksym Krym appointed by him as his deputies have multiple persistent family ties with citizens of the russian federation or conduct business in occupied territories.
5. The Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Program are under development
- Currently, the development of the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030 is undergoing. The adoption of the new SAP and the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030 is Ukraine’s obligation under the Ukraine Facility (Q2 2026).
- We have put all our efforts to include in the draft Strategy problem №2.2.7. on merit-based appointments within the NPU and the SBI with the international partners in the commissions. Once again, during the public consultations with the NACP, we emphasized that the competitive, merit-based appointment of the heads of the NPU and the SBI, with a decisive role for international partners in selection commissions, must be the first and most urgent step in rebooting these institutions.
- What is important now: to approve the Strategy and submit it to Parliament for a vote in exactly this wording, as we advocated to the NACP.
6. Civil society organizations in Ukraine remain a driving force in advocating for and implementing key changes to advance the European integration
- The strongest example of the impact and power of civil society was the nationwide protests in late July 2025 against draft law №12414, through which the President sought to dismantle NABU, SAPO, and the HACC.
- In 2025, MEZHA monitored and pro bono opposed attempts by the Office of the President and the Security Service of Ukraine to sabotage the ESBU Director selection. Public attention and engagement with international partners helped protect the results.
- Likewise, our team is currently monitoring the competition for the Head of the Customs Service and assessing candidates using our own methodology, in cooperation with the Competition Commission.
- One of the main priorities of our civic oversight is monitoring the activities of Parliament. For three years, Parliament was unaccountable, with closed sessions and committees that allowed harmful bills like №12414 to pass. Now, with sessions open, we are closely following every decision.