No More Delay: The National Police Must Change

Executive Summary

The leadership of the National Police of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Police), namely the Head of the Police,  and Heads of the territorial units of the Police , namely the Head of the Police,  and Heads of the territorial units of the Police must be renewed through a transparent competitive selection process with integrity checks and with the involvement of international experts with a prevailing vote. 

The need to introduce transparent and independent selection procedures in the Police has been emphasized as a step in the EU integration process (the EU Commission Enlargement Report on Ukraine for 2024, the Governmental Rule of Law Roadmap), pushed by the civil society (a joint statement by 25 human rights and anti-corruption NGOs, including MEZHA, AntAC, DeJure, Automaidan), and stated in anti-corruption policy documents (the State Anti-Corruption Program of Ukraine for 2023–2025, the Action Plan for the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming Law Enforcement Agencies as part of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine for 2023-2027).

In response to these demands, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police have developed draft law No. 12159 which must have been adopted by the end of 2025. This draft law conflicted with the EU Commission requirements, anti-corruption documents and demands of the civil society of Ukraine. Although draft law No. 12159 was withdrawn following the appointment of the new Cabinet of Ministers on July 17, 2025, it clearly reflects the position of Ukraine’s highest authorities in their unwillingness to introduce competitive procedures.

Thus, now is the best opportunity to develop, in collaboration with civil society, an adequate draft law that meets the requirements of international partners and the expectations of civil society. What the selection process should look like:

• The procedure for the competitive selection of the Head of the Police, Heads of the territorial units of the Police for the competitive selection of the Head of the Police, Heads of the territorial units of the Police must be clearly defined in the law, not in by-laws developed behind closed doors by the government (in fact, the Ministry and the Police themselves);
• The selection commission for the competitive selection of the Head of the Police should consist of 3 international experts, 2 representatives from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and 1 from Ombudsman, with international experts having the prevailing vote (2 obligatory votes of international experts);
• Mandatory integrity checks must be conducted according to criteria established at the law.

Historical Context

Militia Brutality Exposed

After the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014, during which representatives of the former militia brutally suppressed protests and tortured participants, public trust in law enforcement fell to just 5%. This triggered a strong public demand for a complete reboot of the law enforcement system and the removal of discredited personnel. 

Photo: Berkut officer (a member of a special militia unit) is beating participants of the Revolution of Dignity. The shield bears the inscription “Militia” (Police)

In response to public demand, Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov initiated a simulated recertification process for former militia officers and launched the creation of the new National Police of Ukraine. However, instead of a true reboot, the reform turned out to be more of a rebranding. Of the 86,000 officers who underwent re-certification, only 5,400 were dismissed — just 6.3%.

Reform touched only the Patrol Police, leaving core units untouched.

Arsen Avakov focused public attention on the newly created Patrol Police – the visible face of law enforcement that citizens encounter daily. However, the core structures of abuse, such as the Departments of Strategic Investigations, Counter-Narcotics, and the Main Investigation Departments of the Police, underwent little more than a name change, retaining their old personnel.

Ukraine’s Largest Law Enforcement Agency in Numbers

• The largest law enforcement agency – presented in all communities.
• Investigates 57% of all crimes.
• Investigates 74% of all corruption crimes.
• 154,000 cases involving russian forces and accomplices which are then transferred to the Security Service of Ukraine for further jurisdiction (as of May 22, 2025).

Why the National Police Must be Transformed

(1) The Police investigates most of corruption in Ukraine

(2) Borrowed Trust 

Since the start of russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, public trust in the police has increased, similar to other law enforcement bodies. Ordinary police officers assisted with evacuations and, in some cases, even defended the country against the invading army at the cost of their lives. 

Exploiting this hard-earned trust, often built on the genuine heroism of ordinary officers, the Police leadership continues to engage in unlawful and deeply unethical practices.

(3) Recent Cases Involving Police Leadership During the Full-Scale Invasion

Every system has its share of bad actors. However, our call for open competitions for top leadership positions stems from the fact that there has been zero response to high-profile scandals involving Police leadership — despite significant media coverage and public outcry. Below are examples of authorities whose public scandals did not receive any response.

(4) Police Abuses Threatening Businesses 

In 2024, the Police was the most frequently complained-about law enforcement agency by businesses, according to the Business Ombudsman Council. Key problems included non-return of seized assets, baseless criminal proceedings, ineffective investigations, and disproportionate measures in business-related cases.

(5) Systemic Human Rights Violations in 2024: Key Warnings from the Ombudsman’s Report

5.1) Violations in Places of Detention

• Repeated failure to properly address complaints about the unlawful use of force by police (in breach of Article 4 of the Convention against Torture);
• Non-compliance with international and national standards for detention conditions in Police’s temporary holding facilities.

5.2) Violations of Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings 

• Ignoring crime reports, including those involving children;
• Transferring detainees from Justice Ministry facilities to inadequate long-term Police holding sites;
• Failure to return confiscated personal property.

5.3) Inadequate Response to Domestic Violence 

(6) European Court of Human Rights: Systemic Police Violations

Despite reforms, the ECHR continues to find recurring police violations in Ukraine, similar to past cases against the former militia. Recent judgments – such as Bogay and Others v. Ukraine and Beley v. Ukraine (2024) –  illustrate this trend, with most complaints targeting the Police. 

Last chance to transform the National Police

We aim to ensure a truly competitive selection process for Police leadership, as there are already clear international requirements and strong civil society demand for this. The law introducing a competitive selection procedure for Police leadership will be adopted in any case by the end of 2025, but our goal is  to prevent a pseudo-competitive procedure that would allow the current leadership to remain in power.

(1) International Obligations Call for Action

The launch of the competitive selection procedure for the leadership of the Police is identified as an official requirement: 

• in the European Commission’s Enlargement Report 2024 on Ukraine, underscoring the importance of implementing a transparent selection process with a meaningful involvement of independent experts within the context of Ukraine’s European integration.
• in the State Anti-Corruption Program of Ukraine for 2023–2025. 
• in the Action Plan for the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming Law Enforcement Agencies as part of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine for 2023-2027.

(2) The People’s Push for Change

We united 25 anti-corruption, human rights Ukrainian civil society organizations demanding transparent selection processes in the Police, with the involvement of international experts. In pursuit of these reforms, MEZHA, the Anti-Corruption Action Center, DEJURE, and Automaidan have formed a coalition to drive rule of law reforms, in which MEZHA is responsible for matters related to Police reform.

Why We Need International Experts with a Decisive Vote: Lessons Learned

Ukraine’s experience shows that involving international experts in competitive selections is a proven and effective way to ensure transparency and trust in key anti-corruption appointments – as demonstrated by the selections of the heads of NABU, NACP, SAPO, and the ongoing BES Director competition. 

At the same time, we also have negative experience with holding pseudo-competitions, which, due to the lack of a clear procedure, without the prevailing votes of international experts, and other factors, did not lead to the desired outcome and left questionable personnel in the system.

(1) Arsen Avakov’s competition for the Head of the Police

In 2016, Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov initiated a competitive procedure to select the Head of the Police, which resulted in the appointment of Serhiy Knyazev, a figure from the former militia system. Upon taking office, Knyazev began appointing to leadership positions officials who had previously failed the certification process. During his tenure, a major tragedy occurred in 2019 when intoxicated police officers killed a 5-year-old child. Additionally, members of the only reformed unit – the patrol police – were unlawfully detained after stopping a vehicle driven by the chauffeur of a regional police chief, demonstrating resistance to reform and abuse of power within the hierarchy. Knyazev himself was forced to resign in 2019 amid scandal later that year, after his ex-wife was caught attempting to smuggle €650K across the border, with the source of the funds remaining unexplained.

Several factors contributed to the failure of the competition:

• Commission formed without legal framework or external oversight by Minister Arsen Avakov’s discretion.
• Limited mandate: only general skills tests and interviews were conducted, with no assessment of legal knowledge or integrity.
• Minimal role for international experts: decisions required four votes, with just one international expert’s vote enough to influence outcomes.
• Lack of clear legislative basis: competition followed internal Ministry procedures rather than a defined legal process.

(2) First competition for the Director of the Bureau of Economic Security

The outcome of this competition was a complete failure in the Bureau’s performance, which led to the need for its reboot and the involvement of international experts with decisive voting rights in the selection of a new Director.

Yes, inn 2021 a competition was held to select the Director of the newly formed BES, but the process revealed serious shortcomings:

• Absence of independent experts: commission composed of six members – three from the National Security and Defense Council and three from the Verkhovna Rada.
• Lack of transparency and political influence: the process was widely seen as non-transparent and politically biased.
• Predetermined outcome: media disclosed the winner, Andriy Melnyk, before the competition concluded.
• Leadership tied to old system: Melnyk was associated with the discredited tax militia disliked by businesses.

(3) Competition for the position of Director of the State Bureau of Investigations

The selection commission consisted of nine members – six appointed by the President and Verkhovna Rada, and only three independent international experts. 

The dominant role of government-appointed members led to a non-transparent and politically influenced selection process in 2021, which culminated in the appointment of Oleksii Sukhachov. His appointment marked the final transformation of the SBI into a politically dependent law enforcement agency increasingly used to persecute opponents.

This transformation is evidenced by the extensive involvement of the Deputy Head of the Presidential Office, Oleh Tatarov, in the Bureau’s activities. Individuals from Tatarov’s home region, as well as those who wrote academic papers under his supervision, hold senior positions within the institution. Notably, four members of the selection commission were also affiliated with Tatarov and Sukhachov and voted for Sukhachov’s appointment as Director. Since Sukhachov assumed office and Tatarov’s influence grew stronger, leaders of opposition parties and major independent civil society organizations have regularly become targets of the Bureau’s actions.

Several factors contributed to the failure of the competition:

• Dominance of government representatives undermined transparency and impartiality.
• Appointment despite serious integrity concerns, including dismissal for failing a legal knowledge test and misuse of SBI resources for personal purposes by the appointed candidate.
• Candidate’s presentation prepared with SBI staff assistance, undermining fairness.
• Conflict of interest involving a commission member collaborating with the candidate.
• Process controlled by domestic political actors, highlighting systemic challenges in building an independent law enforcement body.

Resistance of the System 

(1) Draft law №12159 without Transparent Competition Procedure 

In July, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police developed a draft aimed at improving the selection process for the Police leadership. This already poses a risk, because the Police cannot be the ones drafting a law to reform themselves — it’s a clear conflict of interest. 

However, an independent review by the MEZHA revealed that the draft does not establish transparent competitions but expands the Ministry’s powers to appoint the Police leadership through non-transparent procedures:

• no clear procedure or defined list of management positions that will be filled through the competition at the law level,
• no international experts with a prevailing vote in commissions,
• no integrity checks of the candidates. 

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention, considering MEZHA’s findings, also highlighted serious corruption risks in the draft. Despite these concerns, the bill was registered on October 28, 2024, under number 12159.

The draft law has not yet been reviewed by the Law Enforcement Committee (the main one) but is already on the 13th session’s agenda, making 2025 critical for the  institutional development of the Police.

This draft law is scheduled for adoption by the end of 2025 according to:

• European Commission’s Enlargement Report on Ukraine, dated 30 October 2024,
• Rule of Law Roadmap.
• Agenda of the Current Parliament Session,
• State Anti-Corruption Program of Ukraine for 2023-2025.

(2) A Closed Committee Unwilling to Cooperate with Civil Society

The Law Enforcement Committee is known for its lack of transparency and political dependence on the Presidential Office. Therefore, they will not be the driving force of the reform and will not be willing to change the approach to appointing Police leadership.

It has already put forward several harmful initiatives, including draft law No. 10242 (threatening media freedom) and No. 13271-1, which poses a threat to anti-corruption efforts by allowing dismissed officials to avoid punishment and undermining lifestyle monitoring altogether.

(3) The Governmental Rule of Law Roadmap Contradicting the EU Enlargement Report 

On May 14, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a Rule of Law Roadmap, which sets out a package of reforms within the framework of the EU accession negotiations under Chapter 23, 24. However, the Roadmap (page 102), envisages that involvement of independent experts in the selection process for the Police leadership will occur only if deemed necessary. This conflicts with the requirements under the Enlargement Report. 

EU Commission Enlargement Report for 2024

Rule of Law Roadmap

↑ “Development and adoption of a law introducing a competitive selection procedure, including, if necessary, the involvement of independent experts, for appointing heads within the National Police of Ukraine (…)”

There is a high risk that they will not be involved at all. Thus, the competition could be politically influenced, resulting in the same individuals with questionable reputations will take up positions of power.

Call to Action

EU Commission: NOT to approve the Rule of Law Roadmap without amendments concerning competitive selection in the National Police with a meaningful involvement of international experts with a prevailing vote.   

The Parliament and the Government of Ukraine: to develop and adopt the draft law defining: 

• A transparent competition for the appointment of the Head of  the National Police through the commission consisting of 3 international experts, 2 representatives from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and 1 from Ombudsman, with international experts having the prevailing vote (2 obligatory votes of international experts);
• A transparent competition for the appointment of Heads of territorial police units;
• Integrity checks for all of the candidates during the competitions.