ANTI-CORRUPTION EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT LAW AMENDING THE LAW OF UKRAINE “ON THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE”

Anti-corruption examination of the draft law amending the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” regarding the assessment of prosecutors’ performance and the selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to a request from MEZHA Anti-Corruption Center, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine sent Letter №31276/38-6-26/11. 3.2 dated March 6, 2026, together with a copy of the draft law amending the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” regarding the assessment of prosecutors’ performance and the selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions (hereinafter referred to as the draft law). The draft law was developed to fulfill Ukraine’s international obligations related to the reform of the prosecutor’s office system. The draft law is still being finalized, has not been published for public discussion, and appears to be the only legislative initiative currently addressing this issue.

The results of the anti-corruption review indicate that the draft law contains a number of corruption risks that require further consideration and does not fully take into account Ukraine’s international obligations or the requirements of national strategic policy documents:

1. The draft law does not cancel the amendments introduced in July 2025 regarding the appointment of prosecutors without a competitive selection process.
2. The draft law does not outline any regulatory requirements for the procedure for evaluating and selecting prosecutors, in particular regarding the order (stages) of evaluation/selection, deadlines, evaluation criteria, guarantees of process transparency, civil society participation, etc.
3. The draft law introduces excessive discretion in assessing candidates’ compliance with criteria of professional competence and integrity.
4. The draft law creates a risk of informal agreements and pressure aimed at appointing “desired” candidates.
5. The draft law proposes granting excessive powers to the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine regarding the approval and appointment of candidates to the commission for evaluating the performance of prosecutors and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, in regional and district prosecutor’s offices, as well as to the commission for evaluating the performance of SAPO prosecutors.
6. The draft law does not take into account the special status of the SAPO when forming the commission for evaluating the performance of SAPO prosecutors.
7. The draft law does not provide for the participation of independent observers in the activities of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, or the commissions for evaluating the performance of prosecutors, in accordance with the requirements of the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Reform of Law Enforcement Agencies as Part of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Sector for 2023–2027.

CONTEXT

The prosecutorial system in Ukraine requires significant institutional reforms in order to strengthen the rule of law, legality, and security in the country. At the same time, practices in which the law enforcement system, under the procedural control of the prosecutor’s supervision is transformed into a tool for political pressure and influence must be eliminated.

Following the events of July 2025 and the active involvement of the Prosecutor General’s Office in actions that undermined the independence of anti-corruption agencies, the need for urgent, comprehensive reform has become even more critical.

Reforming the prosecution system remains a priority in 2026 in the context of Ukraine`s European integration. Indeed, in December 2025, a joint statement by European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka emphasized, among other things, the need to introduce a transparent, merit-based, and competitive selection procedure for prosecutors, including an assessment of professional competence and integrity.

Improving the selection process for prosecutors appointed to administrative positions and introducing procedures to evaluate the quality of their work remain key issues for international partners. These priorities are also mentioned in national strategic documents, such as the Roadmap on the Rule of Law; the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Reform of Law Enforcement Agencies as Part of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Sector for 2023–2027 (hereinafter referred to as the CSP). Furthermore, this is part of GRECO’s recommendations (Recommendation №. XXV).

Specifically, Action 4.6.4 of the CSP provides for the drafting and submission to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of draft law aimed at establishing a transparent and inclusive procedure for the selection and appointment of personnel to law enforcement agencies, including relevant managerial positions within law enforcement bodies and the Prosecutor’s Office. Such a procedure should be based on professional competence and integrity, taking into account best national and international practices for conducting competitive procedures. The CSP also involves independent observers in the activities of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and quality assessment commissions; In addition, it calls for the study and systematization of the practices of such bodies; and providing recommendations to improve the effectiveness of their work.

At the same time, paragraph 1.2 (3) of the Rule of Law Roadmap requires the adoption of legislation that will ensure a more transparent and merit-based selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions in the General’s Prosecutor Office (head and deputy head of a unit), regional and district prosecutor’s offices (head and deputy head of a prosecution office, or a unit within it), which includes: clear criteria for evaluating candidates for the position, including professional competence and integrity; a transparent, competitive, and merit-based selection procedure, including verification of professional competence and integrity, etc.

Given the nature of these measures, the following criteria can be identified for evaluating relevant legislative initiatives concerning the activities of the Prosecutor General`s Office:

• Establishing a transparent and inclusive procedure for the selection and appointment of senior positions within the Prosecutor General’s Office;
• Establishing clear criteria for evaluating candidates for position, including professional competence and integrity;
• Involving independent observers in the activities of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and quality assessment commissions, as well as studying and systematizing the practices of these bodies.
• It is also fair to note as a separate criterion for evaluating this draft law the repeal of the changes introduced by draft law №12414 regarding non-transparent appointments to positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office and in local prosecutor’s offices without competitive procedures. The application of this contextual criterion in the evaluation is linked to the fact that, as long as the Prosecutor General retains unjustifiably broad discretionary powers, measures to implement merit-based selection practices for administrative positions in the prosecutor’s office will not achieve their ultimate goal.

In accordance with these requirements, the Prosecutor General`s Office has prepared a draft law amending the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” concerning the evaluation of prosecutors’ performance and the selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions, which proposes:

• to establish special commissions for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, regional/district prosecutor’s offices, and a commission for evaluating the quality of work of prosecutors in the SAPO;
• to define the categories of administrative positions subject to the proposed selection procedure and falling under the jurisdiction of a specific commission;
• to determine the frequency of performance evaluations;
• to define criteria for professional competence and integrity for candidates, etc.

Despite the need to implement these changes, the draft law contains a number of risks and shortcomings that must be addressed. Moreover, it fails to take into account international obligations and the requirements of national strategic-level legislation, in particular the recommendations of GRECO, the Rule of Law Roadmap, and the CSP. Also, the draft law does not align with the priorities outlined in the joint statement by European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka. 

RISKS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE DRAFT LAW

In July 2025, draft law №12414, aimed at limiting the autonomy and powers of the NABU and the SAPO, contained a number of other harmful provisions that only exacerbated the institutional problems within the prosecution offices. In July 2025, a law was passed allowing prosecutors to be appointed without a competitive selection process during martial law, including individuals from outside the prosecution system (Paragraph 5‑4 of the Transitional Provisions of the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office”). In effect, this means that individuals can work within the prosecution system without competitive selection, testing, or integrity checks. This approach entrenches practices of favoritism, where key positions are filled not by the most competent candidates, but by individuals close to the leadership.

Moreover, this undermines the principle of merit-based selection for public office in accordance with OECD standards, which the EU emphasizes in its most recent enlargement reports for 2024 and 2025.

In improving the selection systems for administrative positions, the Prosecutor General`s Office is attempting to avoid this sensitive issue and finally fully reverse all the harmful changes enacted on July 22, 2025, when draft law №12414 was adopted. Most importantly, this concerns the repeal of amendments regarding the possible appointment of prosecutors without a competitive selection process.

Recommendation: Include provisions repealing paragraph 5-4 of the Transitional Provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”. 

At present, the scope of issues addressed by the draft law is limited to the role of commissions responsible for evaluating and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions within various prosecutorial bodies, their composition, the frequency of evaluations, and ensuring that compliance with professional competence and integrity criteria is a mandatory requirement for candidates during the selection process. 

All key procedural provisions must be (or will not be) provided for in the acts of the Council of Prosecutors in accordance with paragraph 6 of Articles 38-1 and 38-2 of the draft law:

• “The procedure for evaluating prosecutors at all levels is determined by the Regulations on the Evaluation of the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work, which is approved by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine”;
• “The powers and procedures of the commission for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions, which is established in the Prosecutor Generals Office and regional prosecutor’s offices, as well as the commission for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work in the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, are determined by the relevant procedures”;
• “The selection of prosecutors for administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 4–15 of Part 1 of Article 39 of this Law shall be conducted in accordance with the Procedure for Selection for Administrative Positions in the Prosecutor Generals Office, regional, and district prosecutor’s offices, which is approved by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine”;
• “The indicators of compliance with the criteria of professional competence and integrity and the means for establishing them shall be approved by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine.”

Thus, the provisions of the proposed draft law do not allow for the conclusion that the procedure for appointing individuals to administrative positions is transparent, competitive, and merit-based, as the draft law provides almost no regulations governing it.

Recommendation: The draft law should define the fundamental principles and requirements for the procedure for evaluating and selecting prosecutors, specifically regarding the order (stages) of evaluation and selection, deadlines, criteria for assessing work performance, guarantees of process transparency, potential civil society participation, etc. Detailed regulations in the subordinate acts of the Council of Prosecutors can only be established on the basis of procedural requirements for evaluating and selecting prosecutors that are clearly defined in the law.

It follows from the provisions of the draft law that the Council of Prosecutors or the commission merely “takes into account” whether candidates meet the criteria of professional competence and integrity during the selection process. Thus, the draft law proposes to amend Part 5 of Article 39 as follows:

“5. The Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, when selecting candidates and deciding on recommendations for appointment to an administrative position as provided for in paragraphs 6–8 and 11 of Part 1 of this article, shall take into account the candidate’s compliance with the criteria of professional competence and integrity.

The commissions for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, regional, and district prosecutor’s offices, when selecting candidates for the administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 4–5 of Part 1 of this Article and paragraphs 9, 10, 12–15 of Part 1 of this Article, shall take into account the candidate’s compliance with the criteria of professional competence and integrity.”

A candidate for an administrative position must meet the criteria of competence and integrity, and not only these criteria must be taken into account during the selection process. The point is that the process of “taking into account” allows for the partial or selective consideration of such criteria, i.e., not to the full extent (as a result, even partial compliance with the criteria may mean that they are taken into account during the selection process).

For example, in the Law of Ukraine “On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine”, this requirement is specified as mandatory and doesn`t permit ambiguous interpretation: “From among the candidates who have passed the testing, interview, and background checks (…), the candidate selects no more than two candidates who (…), and who also meet the criteria of professional competence and integrity, (…).”

Recommendation: Revise the wording of Part 5 of Article 39 proposed in the draft law as follows: “5. During the selection of candidates and the decision-making process regarding the Council of Prosecutors’ recommendation for appointment to an administrative position provided for in paragraphs 6–8 and 11 of Part 1 of this article, the selected candidates must meet the criteria of professional competence and integrity.

During the selection for administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 4–5 of Part 1 of this Article and paragraphs 9, 10, 12–15 of Part 1 of this Article by the Commission for the Evaluation of the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work and the Selection of Prosecutors for Administrative Positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, regional, and district prosecutor’s offices, the selected candidates must meet the criteria of professional competence and integrity.”

In accordance with the proposed Part 3 of Article 38-3: “The Commission for Evaluating the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work and Selecting Prosecutors for Administrative Positions in the  Prosecutor General`s Office shall submit to the Prosecutor General appropriate recommendations regarding the appointment of the two selected candidates to each of the vacantadministrative positions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part 1 of Article 39 of this Law.”

Moreover, the requirement to submit two candidates does not address the issue if, based on the results of the competition, only one person meets the necessary criteria. This raises the question of whether the absence of a second suitable candidate would require a repeat selection process. Consequently, this creates a risk of potential manipulation, allowing the selection process to be repeated multiple times to secure the appointment of a “preferred candidate”.

Recommendations:

1) Revise paragraph 2 of Part 2 of Article 38-3 as proposed in the draft law to read as follows: “The Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine shall submit to the Prosecutor General appropriate recommendations regarding the appointment of no more than two selected candidates for each of the vacant administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 6–8 and 11 of Part 1 of Article 39 of this Law.”

2) To amend paragraph 2 of Part 3 of Article 38-3, as proposed by the draft law, to read as follows: “The Commission for Evaluating the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work and Selecting Prosecutors for Administrative Positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office shall submit to the Prosecutor General appropriate recommendations regarding the appointment of no more than two selected candidates for each of the vacant administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part 1 of Article 39 of this Law.”

3) To amend paragraph 2 of Part 4 of Article 38-3, as proposed by the draft law, to read as follows: “ The Commission for Evaluating the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work and Selecting Prosecutors for Administrative Positions in Regional and District Prosecutor’s Offices shall submit to the head of the regional prosecutor’s office relevant recommendations regarding the appointment of no more than two selected candidates to each of the vacant administrative positions provided for in paragraphs 9, 10, 12–15 of Part 1 of Article 39 of this Law.”

In accordance with paragraphs 2–6 of Article 38-3 of the draft law, broad powers are granted to the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine regarding the approval and appointment of candidates to the Commission for Evaluating the Quality of Prosecutors’ Work and Selecting Prosecutors for Administrative Positions. 

In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 38-3 of the draft law, the commission for evaluating the performance of prosecutors and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office is established by order of the Prosecutor General, in consultation with the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, consisting of seven members, six of whom are prosecutors holding administrative positions and one member of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine.

The provisions of Part 3 of Article 38-3 stipulate that thecommission for evaluating the performance of prosecutorsand selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in regional and district prosecutor’s offices shall be established by order of the head of the regional prosecutor’s officefrom among prosecutors holding administrative positions, consisting of seven members, in consultation with the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine.

The provisions of Part 4 of Article 38-3 establish that the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine has the authority not only to approve the composition of the relevant commissions and to delegate its representative to the commissions formed under the Prosecutor General`s Office, but also to exercise significant influence over the selection of their members. Specially, if the Council does not approve the proposed candidates, the relevant bodies are required to submit new candidates for consideration. Specifically, the draft law provides that if the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine does not approve the candidates for the commission responsible for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, the commissions for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in regional and district prosecutor’s offices, or the commission for evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work at the SAPO, the Prosecutor General`s Office, the SAPO, or the regional prosecutor’s office must submit a new candidate for the Council’s consideration.

In addition, the provisions of paragraph 2 of Part 4 of Article 38-3 stipulate that in the event of the Council of Prosecutors’ repeated failure to approve candidates for membership on the commissions, it shall independently appoint (delegate) the relevant commission members.

Thus, due to the absence in the draft law of clearly defined criteria by which the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine evaluates candidates for membership on the commissions, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine is granted unlimited discretionary power regarding the formation of commissions at all levels, which creates risks of arbitrary decision-making and non-transparent selection of candidates for the commissions.

Recommendation: Establish clear criteria and deadlines for the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine to review and approve candidates for the commission on evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, the commission on evaluating the quality of prosecutors’ work and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in regional and district prosecutor’s offices, and the commission for evaluating the performance of prosecutors at the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

Specify in the provisions of Article 38-3 of the draft law the requirements for the justification of decisions by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine when approving candidates for the commissions.

The draft law proposes, among other things, to amend the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” by adding paragraph 7-2 to Part 9 of Article 8-1 and Article 38-3, which directly affects the institutional design of the SAPO.

Specifically, it is proposed to supplement Part 9 of Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” with paragraph 7-2, which adds to the powers of the Deputy Prosecutor General, Head of the SAPO the authority to approve the composition of the commission for evaluating the quality of work of SAPO prosecutors, the composition of which is agreed upon by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 38-2 of the draft law,if the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine has not approved candidates for the commission on evaluating the performance of prosecutors and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in the Prosecutor General`s Office, the commissions on evaluating the performance of prosecutors and selecting prosecutors for administrative positions in regional and district prosecutor’s offices, or the commission for evaluating the performance of prosecutors at the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), then the Prosecutor General`s Office, SAPO, and regional prosecutor’s offices shall propose a new candidate. In the event of a repeated failure by the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine to approve candidates for the commissions, it shall independently appoint (delegate) the relevant commission members (those who were not approved).

Thus, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine is granted excessively broad discretionary powers regarding the formation of commissions for evaluating the performance of prosecutors without establishing criteria for approving candidates to the commission, and the ability to unilaterally form the relevant commissions in the event of repeated non-approval of candidates to the commission.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, the SAPO is a legal entity under public law that reports organizationally and functionally directly to the Deputy Prosecutor General, Head of the SAPO (or the person acting in that capacity). The SAPO has its own organizational structure for document management, internal control, human resources management, and other functions necessary for carrying out anti-corruption tasks. Orders issued by the Head of the SAPO are binding on all employees, ensuring independence in decision-making and the exercise of authority.

The provisions of Article 29-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” also establish a separate procedure for selecting candidates and appointing them to positions within the SAPO based on the results of an open competition conducted by a selection committee.

Pursuant to Part 10 of Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, an external independent assessment (audit) of the SAPO’s performance is conducted by a three-member commission appointed by the Prosecutor General based on proposals from international and foreign organizations.

Thus, a substantive analysis of the provisions of Articles 8-1 and 29-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” reveals the legislature’s clear rationale for establishing special procedures for the competitive selection of candidates for positions in the SAPO and for evaluating the effectiveness of those procedures.

The unwarranted expansion of the discretionary powers of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, granting it the ability to unilaterally form a commission to evaluate the performance of SAPO prosecutors, poses risks to the special status of the SAPO and the independence of its prosecutors.

Furthermore, given the current composition of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, there are significant risks of potential influence being exerted on its members to adopt unlawful decisions regarding the formation of commissions to evaluate the performance of SAPO prosecutors. The overwhelming majority of members of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine are prosecutors from the Prosecutor General`s Office and local prosecutor’s offices. Given the current legal and organizational context of the Prosecutor General’s Office activities, as well as the incomplete repeal of the amendments introduced by bill  №12414, these individuals are in a direct employment and procedural relationship with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, who may use the powers granted to him to exert unlawful influence on the activities of the SAPO.

Recommendation: When implementing a system for evaluating the performance of SAPO prosecutors, it is necessary to take into account their special status within the overall prosecutorial system. Instead of granting unlimited powers to the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, it is advisable to take into account the already established system of competitive selection of SAPO prosecutors in accordance with the provisions of Article 29-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, which provides for the conduct of a competition by a Competition Commission consisting of six members: three appointed by the Prosecutor General based on proposals from the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and three based on proposals from international and foreign organizations providing Ukraine with technical assistance in the field of preventing and combating corruption.

Thus, it is proposed that Part 3 of Article 38-2 of the draft law establish that the Quality Assessment Commission shall be formed by order of the Deputy Prosecutor General – Head of the SAPO, and shall consist of:

1. three persons designated by the Deputy Prosecutor General, Head of the SAPO – based on proposals from international and foreign organizations that, in accordance with international or intergovernmental agreements, provide Ukraine with international technical assistance in the field of preventing and combating corruption;
2. three persons – representatives of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine.

Delete the provisions of Part 4 of Article 38-2 of the draft law.

The reservations set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the anti-corruption review of the draft law have already noted that it is unacceptable to grant the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine excessively broad discretionary powers regarding the formation of commissions to evaluate the quality of prosecutors’ work and the selection of prosecutors for administrative positions. At the same time, it should be emphasized separately that the bill does not provide for the participation of independent observers in the implementation of these procedures at all.

One of the criteria of Measure 4.6.4 of the CSP is the involvement of independent observers in the activities of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and the quality assessment commissions. Thus, within the scope of Measure 4.6.4, an independent observer should be understood as a person who is not a representative of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors or the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine. Given that this measure concerns the evaluation of prosecutors’ performance and the selection of prosecutors for managerial (administrative) positions, an “independent observer” should also be understood to mean a person who is not a representative of the prosecution service.

At the same time, Articles 38-1, 38-2, and 38-3 of the draft law provide for the evaluation of prosecutors’ quality and the selection of candidates for managerial (administrative) positions exclusively through the participation of prosecutors delegated to the relevant commissions and representatives of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, without the involvement of independent observers.

It should also be noted that the draft law in its current form does not align with the strategic priority of the CSP set forth in Section 6.2 of Chapter II of the CSP, which aims to promote active civil society participation in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor’s office.

Recommendation: Implementation of the CSP’s measures is mandatory for the prosecution offices and law enforcement agencies and constitutes a direct requirement of the European Union for Ukraine in the context of European integration. In light of the above, the draft law must define the status and powers of independent observers in assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work and in the competitive selection for managerial (administrative) positions, as provided for in paragraphs 4–15 of Part 1 of Article 39 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, as required by Measure 4.6.4 of the CSP.

CONCLUSION

The draft law requires further revisal, as it does not fully comply with international obligations and the requirements of national strategic documents, in particular the GRECO recommendations, the Rule of Law Roadmap, the CSP, as well as the priorities outlined in the joint statement by European Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka.

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